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Abstract
The IMF’s Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal model (GIMF) is used to examine the scope for structural
reforms in the euro area to offset the negative impact of fiscal consolidation required to put public debt back
on a sustainable path. The results suggest that structural reforms in core countries could be expected to offset
the near-term negative impact on activity arising from the required fiscal consolidation. However, for the
periphery, the results suggest that it would take several years before structural reforms could return the level
of output back to its pre-consolidation path.
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1.  Introduction
Several euro area countries must implement substantial fiscal consolidation to put pub-
lic finances back on a sustainable path. Although this required consolidation will improve
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long-run output prospects, it will likely slow activity in the short run. Simultaneously implemen-
ting structural reforms to raise growth could be one way to help mitigate the short-run negative
impact on GDP. We use the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Global Integrated Monetary and
Fiscal Model (GIMF) to provide estimates of the impact structural reforms may have on softening
the near-term contractionary effects of euro area fiscal consolidation.
For the analysis, the euro area is divided into two regions, one with acute fiscal sustainability
issues, referred to as the periphery, and one with less acute sustainability issues, referred to as
the core.3 The magnitudes and the timing of the required consolidation are stylized but loosely
based on the consolidations contained in the April 2013 World  Economic  Outlook  (WEO). We
assume that periphery countries must improve structural fiscal balances by roughly 4 percent of
GDP over the 2013–2018 period, with core countries improving by roughly 2 percent of GDP.
Using a plausible composition of instruments we find that the level of real GDP in 2018 would
be lower than the pre-consolidation path by 1.2 percent in the periphery and 0.6 percent in the
core.
Using OECD estimates of the impact of a range of structural reforms on productivity and
employment in euro area countries, simulations suggest that structural reforms could completely
offset the negative implications of consolidation in the core and lead to a sizable cumulative
net gain in output over the 2014–2018 period. For periphery countries, the estimates suggest
that it will take several years before structural reforms would offset the negative implica-
tions of the required consolidation on activity. Further, the only way that there would be
net cumulative gain in output by 2018 for the periphery is if sizable structural reforms were
implemented.
Looking beyond 2018, the estimates suggest that structural reforms could contribute substan-
tially to raising the level of real GDP in both the euro area core and periphery. For the core, the
estimates suggest that after 10 years, real GDP could be higher by between 3 and 8 percent. This
increase is even after accounting for the impact of the permanent changes in spending and taxes
that would be required under the more plausible consolidation package. Since the periphery is
much further from best practices, the potential gains are even larger, between 4½ and 11 percent
after ten years. These gains occur despite the fact that the magnitude of the consolidation in the
periphery implies cuts in spending and increases in taxes that are double those required in the
core.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of
GIMF. Section 3 contains the GIMF estimates of the impact on activity of a range of fiscal plans that
achieve the desired improvement in structural fiscal balances in the euro area. Section 4 presents
a detailed analysis of the impact on activity of the range of structural reforms recommended by
the OECD in their Going for Growth initiative. Section 5 considers the fiscal consolidations and
structural reforms simultaneously and Section 6 concludes.
2.  The  Global  Integrated  Monetary  and  Fiscal  Model
GIMF is a multicountry Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with opti-
mizing behavior by households and firms and full intertemporal stock-flow accounting. Frictions
3 Those countries with acute fiscal sustainability issues (called periphery) include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain, while the remaining euro area countries are included in the region with less acute sustainability issues (called the
core).
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in the form of sticky prices and wages, real adjustment costs, liquidity constrained households,
along with finite planning horizons of households, imply an important role for monetary and fiscal
policy in economic stabilization. For the sake of brevity, we leave this section stylized, since the
theoretical micro-foundations of the model are described in detail in Kumhof, Laxton, Muir, and
Mursula (2010) and a detailed examination of the GIMF properties can be found in Anderson
et al. (2013).
The presence of overlapping-generation households (OLG) separates GIMF from standard
monetary DSGE models. OLG households discount future tax cuts at a higher rate than the
market rate of interest. Thus, a decrease in government debt today represents a reduction in their
wealth, because a share of the resulting lower taxes in the future is payable beyond their planning
horizon. If the decrease in government debt is permanent, this will crowd in real private capital
by reducing real interest rates, as described by Kumhof and Laxton (2007, 2013).
GIMF also contains liquidity-constrained households (LIQ), who do not save and do not
have access to credit. A high proportion of LIQ households in the population would imply large
short-term fiscal multipliers from changes to taxes and transfer payments.
The non-Ricardian features of the model provide non-neutrality in both spending-based and
revenue-based fiscal measures, which makes the model particularly suitable to analyze fiscal
policy questions. In particular, contractionary fiscal policy can reduce the level of economic
activity in the short run, but a sustained improvement in government fiscal balances crowd in
private investment and net foreign assets in the long run.
Asset markets are incomplete in the model. Government debt is only held domestically, as
nominal, non-contingent, one-period bonds denominated in domestic currency. The only assets
traded internationally are nominal, non-contingent, one-period bonds denominated in U.S. dollars,
that can be issued by the U.S. government and by private agents in any region. Firms are owned
domestically. Equity is not traded in domestic financial markets; instead, households receive
lump-sum dividend payments.
Firms operate in monopolistically competitive markets and thus goods’ prices contain a markup
over marginal cost. Firms employ capital and labor to produce tradable and nontradable intermedi-
ate goods. There is a financial sector à  la  Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), that incorporates
a procyclical financial accelerator, with the cost of external finance facing firms rising with their
leverage.
GIMF is multi-region, encompassing the entire world economy, explicitly modeling all the
bilateral trade flows and their relative prices for each region, including exchange rates. The ver-
sion used in this paper comprises 6 regions: the United States, the euro area core, the euro area
periphery, Japan, emerging Asia, and, as a single entity, the remaining countries. The interna-
tional linkages in the model allow the analysis of policy spillovers at the regional and global
level.
Government spending may take the form of consumption or investment expenditure or lump-
sum transfers. Revenue accrues from the taxes on labor and corporate income, consumption
taxes, and lump-sum taxes. There is a fiscal policy rule which ensures long-run sustainability,
while allowing for short-run counter-cyclical policies. The fiscal rule ensures that in the long run,
the ratio of the government debt-to-GDP – and hence the deficit-to-GDP ratio – remains stable.
This excludes the possibility of sovereign default. The fiscal rule also allows for countercyclical
fiscal policy as it embodies automatic stabilizers.
When conducting monetary policy, the central bank uses an inflation-forecast-based inter-
est rate rule. The central bank varies the gap between the actual policy rate and the long-run
equilibrium rate to achieve a stable target rate of inflation over time.
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3.  The  implications  of  ﬁscal  consolidation
The impact of the consolidation will vary notably depending on the composition of fiscal instru-
ments used. Fig. 1 presents the macroeconomic implications of a stylized consolidation in which
30 percent of the improvement in the fiscal balance is achieved through cuts in public absorption,
30 percent comes from higher value added taxes (VAT), with an additional 30 percent coming
from higher labor income taxes. The final 10 percent comes from an increase in capital taxes.
This consolidation package is very similar to the recent scenarios examined by Annicchiarico, Di
Dio, and Felici (2013) for the case of Italian economy.
The stylized 4 percent improvement in the overall fiscal balance relative to GDP in the periphery
is twice the size of the stylized 2 percent consolidation assumed for the core, and it is more front-
loaded. The periphery achieves peak improvement in the fiscal balance by 2017, and the core by
2016. Once debt-service costs start to decline, the changes in these instruments are assumed to be
gradually unwound while maintaining the desired improvement in the overall fiscal balance. In
the scenarios, it is assumed that the policy interest rate is unable to be reduced in 2014 and 2015
because of the zero interest rate floor (ZIF).
The negative impact on GDP is large and long lived. While the reduction in public absorption
expenditure directly reduces GDP, the tax measures, particularly the labor and capital taxes,
notably amplify the duration of the impact. Raising corporate taxes lowers the return to capital,
and firms respond by cutting investment expenditure. The decline in household income from higher
labor taxes, the increase in the VAT, and decline in the real wages lowers private consumption
expenditure. The fiscal multiplier in both regions in the first year is a little larger than 1. This
reflects both the range of instruments used and the fact that monetary policy is unable to ease for
the first two years given the constraint imposed by the zero lower bound.4 Once policy can ease,
and the benefits from the consolidation start to flow through, the fiscal multiplier falls.
In the short run, the only offsetting impact on GDP is net exports. Government bonds represent
net wealth to households. With the quantity of domestic government bonds falling, domestic
households need to replace government bonds with foreign assets to maintain their desired wealth
position. To facilitate this accumulation of foreign assets, the currency depreciates in the short
run, improving the trade balance.
The easing in monetary policy in 2015, along with the decline in global real interest rates due to
less demand for global savings from euro area sovereigns, reduces the cost of capital and prompts
a gradual recovery in investment. This helps to bring GDP back toward the initial baseline level.
Private consumption, however, takes much longer to start recovering back toward baseline. As
public debt-service costs start to decline, the increase in taxes and cuts in public absorption can
start to be unwound, helping GDP to recover. In the very long run, the reduction in debt-service
cost allows for government absorption to be above its initial level. Additionally, the VAT, labor,
and capital taxes all fall below their initial rates.
Although it takes roughly 40 years before public expenditure and taxes return to their initial
levels, GDP is back to its baseline level after roughly 20 years (horizons not shown in the figure).
The impact of stronger private investment owing to the decline in the global real interest rate more
than offsets the negative impact of the tighter fiscal policy by that horizon, driving GDP back
above baseline.
4 For a more detailed discussion of GIMF’s fiscal-multiplier properties, see Anderson et al. (2013). GIMF’s fiscal
multipliers for temporary fiscal shocks are very similar to standard monetary DSGE models – see Coenen et al. (2012).
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Fig. 1. Consolidation achieved with lower public absorption and higher consumption, labor, and capital taxes.
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Fiscal consolidation measures should be as growth-friendly as possible. To the extent possible,
fiscal authorities should use VAT taxes and transfers as well as government absorption to achieve
consolidation rather than growth unfriendly instruments such as public investment and capital
and labor taxes. A consolidation using transfers to households, which is the most growth-friendly
instrument, would have much less of a negative impact on GDP and is explored in the Appendix.
In this regard, the fiscal composition considered in this scenario is within the mid-range of the
possible impacts.
The benefits from consolidation, particularly in the periphery, could be larger and materialize
sooner if sovereign risk premiums were also to decline as it became evident that the consolidation
plan was being achieved. In the analysis presented here, a decline in sovereign risk premiums is
not included. Countries may be able to bolster the credibility of their fiscal consolidations by com-
mitting to their consolidations, as examined by Hauptmeier, Sanchez-Fuentes, and Schuknecht
(2011).
4.  Structural  reforms
This section provides estimates of the GDP impact of product and labor market reforms that
the OECD has recommended for euro are countries in their “Going for Growth” initiative. These
reforms have been used since 2010 in the G20 Mutual Assessment Process (G20MAP) as part
of their initiatives to promote growth among member countries. Product market reforms aim at
reducing anti-competitive product market regulations. Labor market reforms are more varied, and
include reducing barriers to entry into professions, reducing employment protection legislation,
reducing unemployment benefits, increasing the standard retirement age, reducing the opportunity
cost of continued employment between the ages of 60 and 65, increasing childcare support, and
implementing active labor market programs.
These labor and product markets reforms assume policies align with best practice within the
OECD membership. Estimates on productivity and employment are used as exogenous shocks
to productivity and labor supply in GIMF to generate estimates of the impact on GDP of euro
area countries. There is uncertainty regarding how much of these reforms have already been
implemented.5 Due to this, the simulations attempt to put a range on the magnitude of the possible
gains from moving to best practice. The lower bound is generated assuming that the country has
only 25 percent of the gap remaining to be closed, while the upper bound assumes that 75 percent
of the gap remains to be closed. Further, because there is also considerable uncertainty about
how fast the gains will materialize, to be conservative, we assume a more delayed response of
outcomes to reform than suggested by the OECD estimates.
4.1.  Product  market  reforms
Structural reforms of product market sectors raise productivity if the reforms reduce the reg-
ulatory burden and increase competition. Reforms of this type have been recommended for euro
area countries since they tend to have higher markups than other OECD countries, suggesting
regulatory constraints that curtail competition (Allard et al., 2010; Bouis and Duval, 2011; OECD,
2012). Empirical evidence suggests that if European countries reduced the regulatory burden, there
would be significant increases in total factor productivity (Berger and Danninger, 2007; Bourlès,
5 For example, France has already undertaken measures to increase the standard retirement age, and Spain has imple-
mented reforms to their employment protection legislation.
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Cette, Lopez, Mairesse, and Nicoletti, 2010). The gains from product market reforms increase
output primarily in the countries implementing the reforms (Cacciatore, Duval, and Fiori, 2012)
but can result in sizable gains from trade and productivity spillovers to regions outside the euro
area (Everaert and Schule, 2006; Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti, 2004) and especially to smaller
trading partner countries within the euro area (Gomes, Jacquinot, Mohr, and Pisani, 2013).
The regulatory and anti-competitive burdens in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sec-
tors are estimated using the OECD’s survey-based product market regulation index (see Boylaud
and Nicoletti, 2003). We use the estimates of the impact on productivity from reforms to reduce
these anti-competitive burdens as estimated in Bourlès et al. (2010), and Bouis, Causa, Demmou,
Duval, and Zdzienicka (2012).6
The non-manufacturing sector reforms focus on anti-competitive regulations in the upstream
sectors, which include retail trade, professional, and network services. Retail trade reforms cover
barriers to entry, operational restrictions, and price controls. The professional services cover
barriers to entry and conduct regulation in the legal, accounting, engineering, and architectural
professions. Finally, reforms in the network sectors primarily cover barriers to entry and public
ownership in the energy, transport, and communications sectors. Manufacturing sector reforms
focus on anti-competitive product market regulations, including the state control of business
enterprises, legal and administrative barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to international trade
and investment. The estimates take into account the spillovers from the removal of regulations in
one sector on other sectors.
We assume that the move to best practice takes place over five years starting in 2014 and
increases the multi-factor productivity of each sector and reduces the wage markup in the non-
tradable sector. It is assumed that 30 percent of the non-tradables product market reforms are due
to reduction in barriers to professional services, which reduce wage mark-ups. The manufacturing
and non-manufacturing sector reforms are implemented in the tradable and non-tradable sector
in GIMF, respectively. Over the five years, while reforms are being implemented, households and
firms only gradually learn about the future gains that the reforms will deliver. In the first year for
example, in addition to the increase in productivity that occurs that year, households and firms
expect only 20 percent of the future improvement that the reforms will deliver. This knowledge
of the future gains increases each year until the fifth year, when firms and households correctly
perceive 100 percent of the future gains from reforms.
If authorities are able to implement credible policies, the benefits from the reforms would arrive
faster than due to the earlier perceived benefits of lower debt levels. In this regard, institutions
such as the G20 and European Commission should continue to encourage countries to enact the
policy reforms to which they have committed.
In the simulations, we assume that the fiscal authorities in both regions use the additional
revenue accruing from the higher level of activity to further reduce the level of outstanding public
debt during the period. In the long run, the lower level of public debt implies reduced debt-service
costs. These saving are returned to households in the form of higher transfers. If the reform
dividend was used to reduce distorting taxes, the reform impact on GDP would be even larger
than estimated here.
Fig. 2 shows the impact of these reforms. For euro area core countries (left hand
column), the range of improvement in economy-wide productivity is roughly 2½–7
6 The product market reforms from Bouis et al. (2012) are assumed to be implemented in all euro area countries
excluding Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic due to data constraints.
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Fig. 2. Impact of product market reforms.
percent after 10 years. In periphery countries (right hand column) the range of improve-
ment is larger, from 6 to 17 percent after 10 years. The range of reduction in
the wage markup in the non-tradable sectors is 5–15 percent in core countries and
7½–25 percent in the periphery. Higher productivity and lower markups increase the marginal
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product of labor and capital, leading to higher investment and employment. Real output in core
countries rises by between 1½ and 4½ percent after 10 years. Increases in both capital and labor
utilization drive the higher level of activity. Real investment in the core increases by between 2½
and 7 percent with the range of increase in employment between ¼ and ½ percent. In the periph-
ery, the increase in real GDP ranges between 2½ and 6½ percent after 10 years. This increase in
GDP is driven by increases in investment by between 3½ and 11 percent and in employment by
between ¼ and 1 percent.
It is worth noting that these benefits arrive in a back-loaded fashion and only one third of
the benefits that accrue after ten years are realized by the fifth year. Three factors drive this
result. First, we assume that pace of the increase in productivity is gradually rising and the
pace of decline in markups is gradually increasing for the first five years. Second, during the
five-year period of moving to the best-practice frontier, households and firms only gradually
come to believe that future reforms will be implemented. Consequently, their expectation of the
future productivity growth that the reforms will deliver only rises gradually, limiting their current
period responses. Finally, both investment and labor supply respond only gradually to current
and expected future increases in productivity and real wages due to adjustment costs. If reforms
that moved these economies to best practice could be implemented at a faster pace than assumed
here, some of the benefits could be realized sooner as the first two effects would be moderated.
However, costly adjustment is still likely to result in some back-loading of the realization of
benefits.
4.2.  Labor  market  reforms
Labor market reforms are targeted primarily toward increasing labor supply and focus on
five key areas: active labor market policies; public childcare services; unemployment benefits
replacement rates; public pensions; and employment protection legislation. The simulation results
presented in this section examines the macroeconomic consequences of pursuing all five of these
reforms together. See the Appendix for a decomposition of the contribution of each of the five
components.
Active labor market policies (ALMP) are public programs that ease the job search process for
unemployed workers, provide training programs for the unemployed, and supply public subsidies
for firms and public projects that create jobs specifically for unemployed individuals. It is assumed
that countries increase ALMP spending as a share of GDP to the average within a set of countries
with high ALMP spending. To account for the fiscal implications, public absorption spending is
increased along with the increase in labor supply.
An increase in public childcare services provides incentives for mothers to enter the labor
force, which is particularly relevant for euro area countries due to their low female labor force
participation rates. The estimates used here of the potential impact of implementing child-
care programs come from Jaumotte (2003). Countries increase the ratio of public childcare
spending over GDP per capita to the average of countries with high public childcare-services
spending.
A reduction in unemployment benefit replacement rates (ARR) increases the incentive to search
for employment or possibly leave the labor force, reducing the equilibrium level of unemployment
(Bassanini and Duval, 2006, 2009). Specifically, countries reduce the average replacement rate to
the average within a set of OECD countries with low replacement rates. However, weak demand
and excess capacity conditions could limit the short-term output response to this reform, or even
turn it temporarily negative (Bouis et al., 2012; Cacciatore et al., 2012). Reducing unemployment
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insurance replacement rates lowers disposable income and, if the unemployed do not find jobs,
their high marginal propensities to consume out of income implies household consumption could
decline immediately.
Pension reforms that raise the retirement age and move to actuarial neutrality have been found
to increase the labor force participation rate in Duval (2006), Bassanini and Duval (2006, 2009),
and Bouis et al. (2012). The impact of these reforms has been found to occur gradually, with
participation rates taking over 10 years to converge to the new equilibrium. The reforms consist
of a two-year increase in the standard retirement age and a move to actuarial neutrality that
reduces the implicit tax rate on continued employment to zero for workers between the ages
60–65. The estimates of the impact on labor supply that are used here are taken from Bouis et al.
(2012).
A reduction in employment protection legislation (EPL) eases restrictions on the hiring and
firing of employees. This increases the incentive to search for employment and hire, and is
empirically found to increase the level of labor productivity (Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Bassanini
et al., 2009). However, weak demand conditions could limit the short-term output response of
EPL reforms and possibly even generate a temporary reduction in output (Bouis et al., 2012;
Cacciatore et al., 2012), due to a possible increase in firings as restrictions are reduced. The
reforms assume that countries reduce their EPL to the average level in the three OECD countries
with the lowest regulations. The estimates do not capture a fall in employment in the short
run, but a gradual, albeit small, increase in labor productivity. The estimates of the potential
impact of EPL, ALMP as well as ARR reforms on labor supply in the euro area are taken from
Bassanini and Duval (2006) and take into account the short-run dynamics as found in Bouis et al.
(2012).
Fig. 3 presents the macroeconomic implications of implementing reforms in the five labor
market areas. Unlike the case with product market reforms, we assume labor market reforms
are all fully implemented in 2014. However, the empirical estimates still imply that the labor
supply response occurs gradually and builds over time. As was the case with the product market
reform simulations, we assume that the fiscal authorities use the increased revenue resulting from
the higher level of activity to reduce outstanding debt. In core euro area countries (left hand
column), the range of increases in real GDP after ten years is between 1¼ and 2½ percent. This
reflects increases in productivity of between 0.3 and 0.9 percent after 10 years from reforms to
employment protection legislation and the increases in labor supply from the other four reforms.
With productivity higher and the increase in labor supply reducing real wages, firms increase
investment expenditure by between 1½ and 3½ percent after 10 years. The net result is a total
increase in labor supply that ranges between 1¼ and 2½ percent. The results for periphery countries
(right hand column) are just slightly larger on output, investment and real wages.
Relative to what occurs under product market reforms, the benefits from labor market reforms
are only slightly back loaded. This reflects two key factors. First, when labor market reforms
are implemented in 2014, it is assumed that households and firms fully understand their future
implications and there is no gradual learning. Second, capital accumulation plays a much smaller
role under labor market reforms and thus the impact of the more gradual capital formulation
process is not as apparent. However, if the reforms are implemented when there are weak demand
conditions, and the increase in the labor supply initiated by reforms is not absorbed as quickly as
it is in the simulations, the benefits could be much more back-loaded than suggested here. The
range of impacts from product market reforms presented earlier are notably larger than those from
labor market reforms. For core countries, product market reforms yield GDP outcomes roughly
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Fig. 3. Impact of labor market reforms.
twice as large, while for periphery countries, product market reforms impact on GDP is roughly
five times larger.
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5.  Combined  implications  of  ﬁscal  consolidation  and  structural  reforms
In this section, we overlay the structural reform simulations on the fiscal consolidations to
illustrate the potential scope for reforms to offset the negative near-term implications of the
required tightening in fiscal policy. As presented in Fig. 4, the results suggest that for the core
euro area, structural reforms could quite plausibly eliminate the negative near-term implications
for output of the required fiscal consolidation (left-hand column). For the periphery, even under
the upper bound estimate for the impact of structural reforms on activity, it would be several years
before reforms would be able to offset the negative near-term impact of consolidation (right-hand
column). The results are slightly smaller than those presented in Barkbu, Rahman, Valdes, and a
staff team (2012) because of slightly more conservative assumptions about how long it takes to
close the best-practice gap.
It is worth noting, however, that some of the near-term increase in GDP comes from increased
public expenditures on labor market reforms such as active labor market policies and childcare.
If this spending had to be financed by reducing other public expenditures, it would reduce the
gains from the structural reforms in the first few years. Further, since the benefits of the reforms
are delayed, it is important that countries implement them as soon as possible. Otherwise, the
improvement above the fiscal consolidation will take even longer to materialize.
Two important points are worth noting with regard to public debt and net foreign liabilities.
First, although initially implementing structural reforms marginally raises the ratio of public debt
to GDP owing to increased spending on active labor market polices and childcare, successfully
implementing reforms results in further substantial reductions in the debt-to-GDP ratio on top of
the reductions achieved via consolidation. Reforms generate improvements through two channels,
by raising the level of nominal GDP and by increasing the tax base. While reforms lead to further
improvements in public savings, they do not increase national savings in the euro area. The ratio
of net foreign liabilities to GDP declines below the ratio achieved under just the consolidation in
the core while it remains broadly similar in the periphery. Despite the increase in public savings,
private savings are not sufficient to fully fund the increase in investment resulting from the reforms.
6.  Conclusions
The great recession has left many euro area countries with high debt and deficit levels and
vulnerable to concerns over sovereign default. To prevent contagion risk spreading across the
euro area, proactive polices are needed to consolidate public finances to put public debt back on
a sustainable path. In this paper, we use the IMF’s GIMF to estimate the impact on activity of
implementing stylized consolidations that are broadly consistent with the IMF’s WEO forecast
in each region. We find that the fiscal consolidation could put a drag on the economy for several
years. In particular, the level of real GDP in 2015 would be lower than the pre-consolidation path
by 2.4 percent in the periphery and 1 percent in the core.
Fiscal consolidation should be designed to be as growth-friendly as possible to increase its
effectiveness. To the extent possible, fiscal authorities should use VAT taxes, transfers, as well
as government absorption to achieve consolidation versus less growth friendly instruments such
as public investment, as well as capital and labor taxes. By committing to an array of fiscal
rules in the euro area and enacting policies early, countries could bolster the credibility of their
fiscal consolidations and reap further benefits. Such proactive policy will be much more desirable
then the market pressured consolidation accompanied by increasing borrowing costs experienced
recently by member countries.
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Fig. 4. The net impact of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms.
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Further, there is the scope for offsetting the impact of fiscal consolidation on activity through
implementing wide-ranging structural reforms in product and labor market polices in each euro
area country. Structural reforms, which increase growth, will help ease debt ratio burdens more
quickly than simply by consolidation alone. Fiscal authorities should then use the additional
revenues collected from structural reforms in order to help speed up debt reduction efforts of
fiscal consolidation.
Countries which are further from best practice have a significant opportunity to realize sizeable
gains from structural reforms. For the core, it is quite feasible that structural reforms can offset
even the near-term negative impact of consolidation on activity. However, due to the magnitude
of the consolidation in the periphery, even under the case where 75 percent of the best-practice
gap is closed, it takes several years before GDP is restored to its pre-consolidation level. In the
medium and longer term, the estimates suggest that structural reforms can make a substantial
contribution to raising output in both the core and periphery. The range of impacts from product
market reforms is notably larger than those from labor market reforms. For core countries, product
market reforms yield GDP outcomes roughly twice as large, while for periphery countries, product
market reforms impact on GDP is roughly five times larger.
Given the delay in the benefits of structural reforms, countries should implement reforms
as soon as possible to help offset the negative effects of fiscal consolidation – especially labor
reforms, which have much more front-loaded benefits. Implementing credible forward guidance
policy can allow reforms to provide much faster relief from negative effects of fiscal consolidation.
The G20 and international institutions should continue to put pressure on these countries to
enact consolidation measures and structural reforms to reduce the risk of escalating sovereign
risk. As these simulations show, enacting policies that have been recommended by the G20
Mutual Assessment Process and the OECD is paramount in achieving their objectives of achieving
sustainable public finances and encouraging growth.
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